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Abstract Perceptual decision-makers often display a constant rate of errors independent of
evidence strength. These ‘lapses’ are treated as a nuisance arising from noise tangential to the
decision, e.g. inattention or motor errors. Here, we use a multisensory decision task in rats to
demonstrate that these explanations cannot account for lapses’ stimulus dependence. We propose
a novel explanation: lapses reflect a strategic trade-off between exploiting known rewarding
actions and exploring uncertain ones. We tested this model’s predictions by selectively
manipulating one action’s reward magnitude or probability. As uniquely predicted by this model,
changes were restricted to lapses associated with that action. Finally, we show that lapses are a
powerful tool for assigning decision-related computations to neural structures based on disruption
experiments (here, posterior striatum and secondary motor cortex). These results suggest that
lapses reflect an integral component of decision-making and are informative about action values in
normal and disrupted brain states.
Introduction
Perceptual decisions are often modeled using noisy ideal observers (e.g., Signal detection theory,
Green and Swets, 1966; Bayesian decision theory, Dayan and Daw, 2008) that explain subjects’
errors as a consequence of noise in sensory evidence. This predicts an error rate that decreases with
increasing sensory evidence, capturing the sigmoidal relationship often seen between evidence
strength and subjects’ decision probabilities (i.e. the psychometric function).
Human and nonhuman subjects often deviate from these predictions, displaying an additional
constant rate of errors independent of the evidence strength known as ‘lapses’, leading to errors
even on extreme stimulus levels (Wichmann and Hill, 2001; Busse et al., 2011; Gold and Ding,
2013; Carandini and Churchland, 2013). Despite the knowledge that ignoring or improperly fitting
lapses can lead to serious mis-estimation of psychometric parameters (Wichmann and Hill, 2001;
Prins and Kingdom, 2018), the cognitive mechanisms underlying lapses remain poorly understood.
A number of possible sources of noise have been proposed to explain lapses, typically tangential to
the decision-making process.
One class of explanations for lapses relies on pre-decision noise added due to fluctuating atten-
tion, which is often operationalized as a small fraction of trials on which the subject fails to attend to
the stimulus (Wichmann and Hill, 2001). On these trials, it is assumed that the subject cannot specify
the stimulus (i.e. sensory noise with infinite variance, Bays et al., 2009) and hence guesses randomly
or in proportion to prior beliefs. This model can be thought of as a limiting case of the Variable Pre-
cision model, which assumes that fluctuating attention has a more graded effect of scaling the sen-
sory noise variance (Garrido et al., 2011), giving rise to heavy tailed estimate distributions,
resembling lapses in the limit of high variability (Shen and Ma, 2019; Zhou et al., 2018). Temporal
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forms of inattention have also been proposed to give rise to lapses, where the animal ignores early
or late parts of the evidence (impulsive or leaky integration, Erlich et al., 2015).
An alternative class of explanations for lapses relies on a fixed amount of noise added after a
decision has been made, commonly referred to as ‘post-categorization’ noise (Erlich et al., 2015) or
decision noise (Law and Gold, 2009). Such noise could arise from errors in motor execution (e.g. fin-
ger errors, Wichmann and Hill, 2001), non-stationarities in the decision rule arising from computa-
tional imprecision (Findling et al., 2018), suboptimal weighting of choice or outcome history
(Roy et al., 2018; Busse et al., 2011), or random variability added for the purpose of exploration (e.
g. ‘e-greedy’ decision rules).
A number of recent observations have cast doubt on fixed early- or late-stage noise as satisfac-
tory explanations for lapses. For instance, many of these explanations predict that lapses should
occur at a constant rate, while in reality, lapses are known to reduce in frequency with learning in
nonhuman primates (Law and Gold, 2009; Cloherty et al., 2019). Further, they can occur with dif-
ferent frequencies for different stimuli even within the same subject (in rodents, Nikbakht et al.,
2018; and humans, Mihali et al., 2018; Bertolini et al., 2015; Flesch et al., 2018), suggesting that
they may reflect task-specific, associative processes that can vary within a subject.
Lapse frequencies are even more variable across subjects and can depend on the subject’s age
and state of brain function. For instance, lapses are significantly higher in children and patient popu-
lations than in healthy adult humans (Roach et al., 2004; Witton et al., 2017; Manning et al.,
2018). Moreover, a number of recent studies in rodents have found that perturbing neural activity in
secondary motor cortex (Erlich et al., 2015) and striatum (Yartsev et al., 2018; Guo et al.,
2018) has dramatic, asymmetric effects on lapses in auditory decision-making tasks. Because these
perturbations were made in structures known to be involved in action selection, an intriguing possi-
bility is that lapses reflect an integral part of the decision-making process, rather than a peripheral
source of noise. However, because these studies only tested auditory stimuli, they did not afford the
opportunity to distinguish sensory modality-specific deficits from general decision-related deficits.
Taken together, these observations point to the need for a deeper understanding of lapses that
accounts for effects of stimulus set, learning, age, and neural perturbations.
Here, we leverage a multisensory decision-making task in rodents to reveal the inadequacy of tra-
ditional models. We challenge a key assumption of perceptual decision-making theories, i.e. sub-
jects’ perfect knowledge of expected rewards (Dayan and Daw, 2008), to uncover a novel
explanation for lapses: uncertainty-guided exploration, a well-known strategy for balancing explora-
tion and exploitation in value-based decisions. We test the predictions of the exploration model for
perceptual decisions by manipulating the magnitude and probability of reward under conditions of
varying uncertainty. Finally, we demonstrate that suppressing secondary motor cortex or posterior
striatum unilaterally has an asymmetric effect on lapses that generalizes across sensory modalities,
but only in uncertain conditions. This can be accounted for by an action value deficit contralateral to
the inactivated side, reconciling the proposed perceptual and value-related roles of these areas and
suggesting that lapses are informative about the subjective values of actions, reflecting a core com-
ponent of decision-making.
Results
Testing ideal observer predictions in perceptual decision-making
We leveraged an established decision-making task (Raposo et al., 2012; Sheppard et al., 2013;
Licata et al., 2017) in which freely moving rats judge whether the fluctuating rate of a 1000 ms
series of auditory clicks and/or visual flashes (rate range: 9–16 Hz) is high or low compared with an
abstract category boundary of 12.5 Hz (Figure 1a–c). Using Bayesian decision theory, we con-
structed an ideal observer for our task that selects choices that maximize expected reward (see
Materials and methods: Modeling). To test whether behavior matches ideal observer predictions, we
presented multisensory trials with matched visual and auditory rates (i.e., both modalities carried the
same number of events per second; Figure 1c, bottom) interleaved with visual-only or auditory-only
trials. This allowed us to separately estimate the sensory noise in the animal’s visual and auditory sys-
tem, and compare the measured performance on multisensory trials to the predictions of the ideal
observer.
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Figure 1. Testing ideal observer predictions in perceptual decision-making. (a) Schematic drawing of rate discrimination task. Rats initiate trials by
poking into a center port. Trials consist of visual stimuli presented via a panel of diffused LEDs, auditory stimuli presented via a centrally positioned
speaker, or multisensory stimuli presented from both. Rats are rewarded with a 24 mL drop of water for reporting high-rate stimuli (greater than 12.5 Hz)
with rightward choices and low-rate stimuli (lower than 12.5 Hz) with leftward choices. (b) Timeline of task events. (c) Example stimulus on auditory (top),
visual (middle), and multisensory trials (bottom). Stimuli consist of a stream of events separated by long (100 ms) or short (50 ms) intervals. Multisensory
stimuli consist of visual and auditory streams carrying the same underlying rate. Visual, auditory, and multisensory trials were randomly interleaved (40%
visual, 40% auditory, and 20% multisensory). (d) Schematic outlining the computations of a Bayesian ideal observer. Stimulus belonging to a true
category c with a true underlying rate s gives rise to noisy observations xA and xV , which are then integrated with each other and with prior beliefs to
form a multisensory posterior belief about the category, and further combined with reward information to form expected action values QL;QR. The ideal
observer selects the action â with maximum expected value. Lightning bolts denote proposed sources of noise that can give rise to (red) or exacerbate
Figure 1 continued on next page
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Performance was assessed using a psychometric curve, that is, the probability of high-rate deci-
sions as a function of stimulus rate (Figure 1f). The ideal observer model predicts a relationship
between the slope of the psychometric curve and noise in the animal’s estimate: the higher the stan-
dard deviation (s) of sensory noise, the more uncertain the animal’s estimate of the rate and the
shallower the psychometric curve. On multisensory trials, the ideal observer should have a more cer-
tain estimate of the rate (Figure 1e, visual [blue] and auditory [green] s values are larger than multi-
sensory s [red]), driving a steeper psychometric curve (Figure 1f, red curve is steeper than green
and blue curves). Since this model does not take lapses into account, it would predict perfect perfor-
mance on the easiest stimuli on all conditions, and thus all curves should asymptote at 0 and 1
(Figure 1f).
Lapses cause deviations from ideal observer and are reduced on
multisensory trials
In practice, the shapes of empirically obtained psychometric curves do not perfectly match the ideal
observer (Figure 2) since they asymptote at values that are less than 1 or greater than 0. This is a
well-known phenomenon in psychophysics (Wichmann and Hill, 2001), requiring two additional
lapse parameters to precisely capture the asymptotes. To account for lapses, we fit a four-parameter
psychometric function to the subjects’ choice data (Figure 2a – red, Equation 1 in Materials and
methods) with the Palamedes toolbox (Prins and Kingdom, 2018). g and l are the lower and upper
asymptotes of the psychometric function, which parameterize lapses on low and high rates respec-
tively; f is a sigmoidal function, in our case the cumulative normal distribution; x is the event rate,
that is, the average number of flashes or beeps presented during the 1 s stimulus period; m parame-
terizes the midpoint of the psychometric function and s describes the inverse slope after correcting
for lapses.
How can we be sure that the asymptotes seen in the data truly reflect nonzero asymptotes rather
than fitting artifacts or insufficient data at the asymptotes? To test whether lapses were truly neces-
sary to explain the behavior, we fit the curves with and without lapses (Figure 2b) and tested
whether the lapse parameters were warranted. The fit without lapses was rejected in 15/17 rats by
the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) and in all rats by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Fitting
a fixed lapse rate across conditions was not sufficient to capture the data, nor was fitting a lapse
rate that was constrained to be less than 0.1 (Wichmann and Hill, 2001). Both data pooled across
subjects and individual subject data warranted fitting separate lapse rates to each condition (‘vari-
able lapses’ model outperforms ‘fixed lapses’, ‘restricted lapses’ or ‘no lapses’ in 13/17 individuals
based on BIC, all individuals based on AIC and in pooled data based on both, Figure 2g).
Multisensory trials offer an additional, strong test of ideal observer predictions. In addition to per-
fect performance on the easiest stimuli, the ideal observer model predicts the minimum possible
perceptual uncertainty achievable on multisensory trials through optimal integration (Ernst and
Bülthoff, 2004; Equation 9 in Materials and methods). By definition, better-than-optimal perfor-
mance is impossible. However, studies in humans, rodents, and nonhuman primates performing mul-
tisensory decision-making tasks suggest that in practice, performance occasionally exceeds optimal
predictions (Raposo et al., 2012; Nikbakht et al., 2018; Hou et al., 2018), seeming, at first, to vio-
late the ideal observer model. Moreover, in these data sets, performance on the easiest stimuli was
not perfect and asymptotes deviated from 0 and 1. As in these previous studies, when we fit perfor-
mance without lapses, multisensory performance was significantly supra-optimal (p=0.0012, paired
t-test), i.e. better than the ideal observer prediction (Figure 2c, black points are above the unity
line). This was also true when lapse probabilities were assumed to be fixed across conditions
Figure 1 continued
(gray) lapses, causing deviations from the ideal observer. (e) Posterior beliefs on an example trial assuming flat priors. Solid black line denotes true
rate, and blue and green dotted lines denote noisy visual and auditory observations, with corresponding unisensory posteriors shown in solid blue and
green. Solid red denotes the multisensory posterior, centered around the maximum a posteriori rate estimate in dotted red. Shaded fraction denotes
the probability of the correct choice being rightward, with m denoting the category boundary. (f) Ideal observer predictions for the psychometric curve,
that is, proportion of high-rate choices for each rate. Inverse slopes of the curves in each condition are reflective of the posterior widths on those
conditions, assuming flat priors. The value on the abscissa corresponding to the curve’s midpoint indicates the subjective category boundary, assuming
equal rewards and flat priors.
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(p=0.0018, Figure 2c, purple) or when they were assumed to be less than 0.1 (p=0.0003, Figure 2c,
yellow). However, when we allowed lapses to vary freely across conditions, performance was indistin-
guishable from optimal (Figure 2d, data points are on the unity line). This reaffirms that proper
treatment of lapses is crucial for accurate estimation of perceptual parameters and offers a potential
explanation for previous reports of supra-optimality.
Using this improved fitting method, we replicated previous observations Raposo et al., 2012











































































































































































































Figure 2. Deviations from ideal observer reflect lapses in judgment. (a) Schematic psychometric performance of an ideal observer (black) vs. a model
that includes lapses (red). The ideal observer model includes two parameters: midpoint (m) and inverse slope (s). The four-parameter model includes m,
s, and lapse probabilities for low-rate (g ) and high-rate choices (l). Dotted line shows the true category boundary (12.5 Hz). (b) Subject data was fit with
a two-parameter model without lapses (black) and a four-parameter model with lapses (red). (c and d) Ideal observer predictions vs. measured
multisensory sigma for fits with and without variable lapses across conditions. (c) Multisensory integration seems supra-optimal if lapses are not
accounted for (no lapses, black), fixed across conditions (fixed lapses, purple), or assumed to be less than 0.1 (restricted lapses, yellow). (d) Optimal
multisensory integration is restored when allowing lapses to vary freely across conditions (n = 17 rats. Points represent individual rats. Data points that
lie on the unity line represent cases in which the measured sigma was equal to the optimal prediction). (e) Rats’ psychometric curves on auditory
(green), visual (blue), and multisensory (red) trials. Points represent data pooled across 17 rats, and lines represent separate four-parameter fits to each
condition. (f) Fit values of sigma (top) and lapse parameters (bottom) on unisensory and multisensory conditions. Both parameters showed significant
reduction on the multisensory conditions (paired t-test, p<0.05); n = 17 rats (347,537 trials). (g) Model comparison using Bayes Information Criterion
(pink) and Akaike Information Criterion (blue) for fits to pooled data across subjects (top) and to individual subject data (bottom). Lower scores indicate
better fits. Both metrics favor a model where lapses are allowed to vary freely across conditions (‘Variable lapse’) over one without lapses (‘No lapses’),
one with a fixed probability of lapses (‘Fixed lapse’), or where the lapses are restricted to being less than 0.1 (‘Restricted lapse’).
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(Figure 2e, red curve is steeper than green/blue curves; Figure 2f, top). Interestingly, we observed
that animals also had a lower lapse probability (lþ g) on multisensory trials (Figure 2e, asymptotes
for red curve are closer to 0 and 1; n = 17 rats, 347,537 trials). This was consistently observed across
animals (Figure 2f, bottom; the probability of lapses on multisensory trials was 0.06 on average,
compared to 0.17 on visual, p=1.4e-4 and 0.21 on auditory, p=1.5e-5). We also noticed that com-
pared to unisensory trials, multisensory trials were slightly biased toward high rates. This bias may
reflect that animals’ decisions do not exclusively depend on the rate of events, but are additionally
weakly influenced by the total event count, as has been previously reported on a visual variant of the
task (Odoemene et al., 2018).
Uncertainty-guided exploration offers a novel explanation for lapses
where traditional explanations fail
What could account for the reduction in lapse probability on multisensory trials? While adding extra
parameters to the ideal observer model fit the behavioral data well and accurately captured the
reduction in inverse-slope on multisensory trials, this success does not provide an explanation for
why lapses are present in the first place, nor why they differ between stimulus conditions.
To investigate this, we examined possible sources of noise that have traditionally been invoked to
explain lapses (Figure 1d). The first of these explanations is that lapses might be due to a fixed
amount of noise added once the decision has been made. These sources of noise could include deci-
sion noise due to imprecision (Findling et al., 2018) or motor errors (Wichmann and Hill, 2001).
However, these sources should hinder decisions equally across stimulus conditions (Figure 3—figure
supplement 1b), which cannot explain our observation of condition-dependent lapse rates
(Figure 2f).
A second explanation is that lapses arise due to inattention on a small fraction of trials. Inatten-
tion would drive the animal to guess randomly, producing lapse rates whose sum should reflect the
probability of not attending (Figure 3a, Materials and methods). According to this explanation, the
lower lapse rate on multisensory trials could reflect increased attention on those trials, perhaps due
to their increased bottom-up salience (i.e. two streams of stimuli instead of one). To examine this
possibility, we leveraged a multisensory condition that has been used to manipulate perceptual
uncertainty without changing salience in rats and humans (Raposo et al., 2012). Specifically, we
interleaved standard matched-rate multisensory trials with ‘neutral’ multisensory trials for which the
rate of the auditory stimuli ranged from 9 to 16 Hz, while the visual stimuli was always 12 Hz. This
rate was so close to the category boundary (12.5 Hz) that it did not provide compelling evidence for
one choice or the other (Figure 3d, left), thus reducing the information in the multisensory stimulus
and increasing perceptual uncertainty on ‘neutral’ trials. However, since both ‘neutral’ and ‘matched’
conditions are multisensory, they should be equally salient, and since they are interleaved, the animal
would be unable to identify the condition without actually attending to the stimulus. According to
the inattention model, matched and neutral trials should have the same rate of lapses, only differing
in their inverse-slope s (Figure 3a, Figure 3—figure supplement 1c).
Contrary to this prediction, we observed higher lapse rates in the ‘neutral’ condition, where trials
had higher perceptual uncertainty on average, compared to the ‘matched’ condition (Figure 3d).
This correlation between the average perceptual uncertainty in a condition and its frequency of
lapses was reminiscent of the correlation observed while comparing unisensory and multisensory tri-
als (Figure 2e,f; Figure 3—figure supplement 1e).
Having observed that traditional explanations of lapses fail to account for the behavioral observa-
tions, we re-examined a key assumption of ideal observer models used in perceptual decision-mak-
ing – that subjects have complete knowledge about the rules and rewards (Dayan and Daw, 2008).
In general, this assumption may not hold true for a number of reasons – even when the stimulus cat-
egory is known with certainty, subjects might have uncertainty about the values of different actions
because they are still in the process of learning (Law and Gold, 2009), because they incorrectly
assume that their environment is nonstationary (Yu and Cohen, 2008), or because they forget over
time (Gershman, 2015; Drugowitsch and Pouget, 2018). In such situations, rather than always
‘exploiting’ (i.e. picking the action currently assumed to have the highest value), it is advantageous
to ‘explore’ (i.e. occasionally pick actions whose value the subject is uncertain about), in order to
gather more information and maximize reward in the long term (Dayan and Daw, 2008).















































































































































































































































Figure 3. Uncertainty-guided exploration offers a novel explanation for lapses. Models of lapses in decision-making: (a) Inattention model of lapses.
Left panel: Observer’s posterior belief about rate. On a large fraction of trials given by pattend , the observer attends to the stimulus and has a peaked
belief about the rate whose width reflects perceptual uncertainty (red curve on matched trials, orange curve on neutral trials), but on a small fraction of
trials given by 1  pattend , the observer does not attend to the stimulus (black curve), leading to equal posterior beliefs of rates being high or low
(shaded, clear regions of curves respectively) and guesses according to the probability bias, giving rise to lapses (right panel). The sum of lapse rates
then reflects 1  pattend , while their ratio reflects the bias. Since matched and neutral trials are equally salient, they are expected to have the same pattend
and hence similar overall lapse rates. (b) Fixed error model of lapses. Lapses could arise due to motor errors occurring on e fraction of trials, or from
decision rules that explore on a fixed proportion e of trials (black), rather than always maximizing reward (blue). The sum of lapses reflects e while their
ratio reflects any bias in motor errors or exploration, leading to a fixed rate of lapses across conditions. (c) Uncertainty-guided exploration model.
Lapses can also arise from more sophisticated exploratory decision rules such as the ‘softmax’ decision rule. Since the difference in expected value
from right and left actions (QR   QL) is bounded by the maximum reward magnitudes rRight and rLeft , even when the stimulus is very easy, the maximum
probability of choosing the higher value option is not 1, giving rise to lapses. Lapse rates on either side are then proportional to the reward magnitude
on that side, and to a ‘temperature’ parameter b that is modulated by the uncertainty in action values. Conditions with higher overall perceptual
uncertainty (e.g. neutral, orange) are expected to have higher value uncertainty, and hence higher lapses. (d) Left: multisensory stimuli designed to
distinguish between attentional and non-attentional sources of lapses. Standard multisensory stimuli with matched visual and auditory rates (top) and
‘neutral’ stimuli where one modality has a rate very close to the category boundary and is uninformative (bottom). Both stimuli are multisensory and
Figure 3 continued on next page
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Exploratory choices of the lower value action for the easiest stimuli would resemble lapses, and the
sum of lapses would reflect the overall degree of exploration.
Choosing how often to explore is challenging and requires trading off immediate rewards for
potential gains in information – random exploration would reward subjects at chance, but would
reduce uncertainty uniformly about the value of all possible stimulus-action pairs, while a greedy pol-
icy (i.e. always exploiting) would yield many immediate rewards while leaving lower value stimulus-
action pairs highly uncertain (Figure 3—figure supplement 2a,b). Policies that explore randomly on
a small fraction of trials (e.g. ‘e-Greedy’ policies) do not make prescriptions about how often the sub-
ject should explore, and are behaviorally indistinguishable from motor errors when the fraction is
fixed (Figure 3b). One elegant way to automatically balance exploration and exploitation is to
explore more often when one is more uncertain about action values. In particular, a form of uncer-
tainty-guided exploration called Thompson sampling is asymptotically optimal in many general envi-
ronments (Leike et al., 2016), achieving lower regret than other forms of exploration (Figure 3—
figure supplement 2c). This can be thought of as a dynamic ‘softmax’ policy (Figure 3c), whose
‘inverse temperature’ parameter (b) scales with uncertainty (Gershman, 2018). This predicts a lower
b when values are more uncertain, encouraging more exploration and more frequent lapses, and a
higher b when values are more certain, encouraging exploitation. The limiting case of perfect knowl-
edge (b ! ¥) reduces to the reward-maximizing ideal observer.
Subjects’ uncertainty about stimulus-action values is compounded by perceptual uncertainty – on
trials where the stimulus category is not fully known, credit cannot be unambiguously assigned to
one stimulus-action pair when rewards are obtained and value uncertainty is only marginally
reduced. Hence conditions where trials have higher perceptual uncertainty on average (e.g. unisen-
sory or neutral trials) will have more overlapping value beliefs, encouraging more exploration and
giving rise to more frequent lapses (Figure 3—figure supplement 2d).
As a result, on neutral multisensory trials, the uncertainty-guided exploration model predicts an
increase not only in the inverse slope parameter s, but also in the rate of lapses, just as we observed
(Figure 3d). In fact, this model predicts that both slope and lapse parameters on neutral trials should
match those on auditory trials, since these conditions have comparable levels of perceptual uncer-
tainty. The data was well fit by the exploration model (Figure 3e, bottom) and satisfied both predic-
tions (Figure 4—source data 1, Neutral has higher s and lower b than Multisensory, and matched s
and b to Auditory) . By contrast, the inattention model predicts that both conditions would have the
same lapse rates, with the neutral condition simply having a larger inverse slope s. This model pro-
vided a worse fit to the data, particularly missing the data at extreme stimulus values where lapses
are most clearly apparent (Figure 3e, top). Model comparison using BIC and AIC favored the explo-
ration model over the inattention model, both for fits to pooled data across subjects (Figure 3f, top)
and fits to individual subject data (Figure 3f, bottom, Figure 3—figure supplement 3, for the 3/5
subjects rejected by ideal observer model that is, with sizable lapses. Both predictions of the explo-
ration model were confirmed using unconstrained descriptive fits to individuals, and held up for 4/5
subjects).
To further understand the precise relationship between perceptual uncertainty and lapses under
this form of exploration, we simulated learning in a Thompson sampling agent for various levels of
sensory noise, and found a roughly linear relationship between sensory noise and average lapse
rate. Hence we fit a constrained version of the exploration model to the multisensory data from 17
rats, where the degree of exploratory lapses was constrained to be a linear function of that
Figure 3 continued
designed to have equal bottom-up salience, and can only be distinguished by attending to them and accumulating evidence. Right: rat performance
on interleaved matched (red) and neutral (orange) trials. (e) Model fits (solid lines) overlaid on average data points. Deviations from model fits are
denoted with arrows. The exploration model (bottom) provides a better fit than the inattention model (top), since it predicts higher lapse rates on
neutral trials (orange). (f) Model comparison using Bayes Information Criterion (pink) and Akaike Information Criterion (blue) both favor the uncertainty-
guided exploration model for pooled data (top) as well as individual subject data (bottom).
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 3:
Figure supplement 1. Uncertainty-dependent exploration is the only model that accounts for behavioral data from all three manipulations.
Figure supplement 2. Thompson sampling, which balances exploration and exploitation, predicts lapses that increase with perceptual noise.
Figure supplement 3. Uncertainty guided exploration outperforms competing models for average and individual data.
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condition’s sensory noise (with two free parameters – slope and intercept, rather than three free
parameters for the three conditions). This model yielded lower BIC than the unconstrained explora-
tion model in all 14/17 rats that were rejected by the ideal observer model (Figure 3—figure sup-
plement 3c), and yielded similar slope and intercept parameters across animals (Figure 3—figure
supplement 2e).
Reward manipulations confirm predictions of exploration model
One of the key claims of the uncertainty-guided exploration model is that lapses are exploratory
choices made with full knowledge of the stimulus, and should therefore depend only on the
expected rewards associated with that stimulus category (Figure 3—figure supplement 2). This is in
stark contrast to the inattention model and many other kinds of disengagement (Figure 4—figure
supplement 1), according to which lapses are caused by the observer disregarding the stimulus, and
hence lapses at the two extreme stimulus levels are influenced by a common underlying guessing
process that depends on expected rewards from both stimulus categories. This is also in contrast to
fixed error models such as motor error or e-greedy models in which lapses are independent of
expected reward (Figure 3b).
Therefore, a unique prediction of the exploration model is that selectively manipulating expected
rewards associated with one of the stimulus categories should only change the explore–exploit
tradeoff for that stimulus category, selectively affecting lapses at one extreme of the psychometric
function. Conversely, inattention and other kinds of disengagement predict that both lapses should
be affected, while fixed error models predict that neither should be affected (Figure 4a, Figure 3—
figure supplement 1, Figure 4—figure supplement 1).
To experimentally test these predictions, we tested rats on the rate discrimination task with asym-
metric rewards (Figure 4b, top). Instead of rewarding high- and low-rate choices equally, we
increased the water amount on the reward port associated with high rates (rightward choices) so it
was 1.5 times larger than before, without changing the reward on the low-rate side (leftward
choices). In a second rat cohort we did the opposite: we devalued the choices associated with high-
rate trials by decreasing the water amount on that side port, and so it was 1.5 times smaller than
before, without changing the reward on the low-rate side.
The animals’ behavior on the asymmetric-reward task matched the predictions of the exploration
model. Increasing the reward size on choices associated with high rates led to a decrease in lapses
for the highest rates and no changes in lapses for the lowest rates (Figure 4c, left; n = 3 rats, 6976
trials). Decreasing the reward of choices associated with high rates led to an increase in lapses for
the highest rates and no changes in lapses for the lower rates (Figure 4c, right; n = 3 rats, 11,164 tri-
als). This shows that both increasing and decreasing the value of actions associated with one of the
stimulus categories selectively affects lapses on that stimulus category, unlike the predictions of the
inattention model.
A key claim of the uncertainty-guided exploration model is that the effects of reward manipula-
tions on lapses arise from a selective shift in the trade-off between exploiting the most rewarding
action and exploring uncertain ones, rather than from a non-selective bias toward the side with big-
ger rewards. Importantly, the model predicts that in the absence of uncertainty, decisions should be
perfectly exploitative and unaffected by reward imbalances, since subjects would always be compar-
ing perfectly certain, nonzero rewards to zero. To determine whether the effects that we observed
were truly driven by uncertainty, we examined performance on randomly interleaved ‘sure bet’ trials
on which the uncertainty was very low (Figure 4b, bottom). On these trials, a pure tone was played
during the fixation period, after which an LED at one of the side ports was clearly illuminated, indi-
cating a reward. Sure-bet trials comprised 6% of the total trials, and as with the rate discrimination
trials, left and right trials were interleaved. Owing to the low perceptual uncertainty and conse-
quently low value uncertainty, the model predicts that animals would quickly reach an ‘exploit’
regime, achieving perfect performance on these trials. Importantly, our model predicts that perfor-
mance on these ‘sure-bet’ trials would be unaffected by imbalances in reward magnitude, since the
‘exploit’ action remains unchanged.
In keeping with this prediction, performance on sure-bet trials was near perfect (rightward proba-
bilities of 0.003 [0.001,0.01] and 0.989 [0.978,0.995] on go-left and go-right trials respectively) and
unaffected following reward manipulations (Figure 4d: Rightward probabilities of 0.004 [0.001,
0.014] and 0.996 [0.986,0.999] on increased reward, 0.006 [0.003,0.012] and 0.99 [0.983,0.994] on
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Figure 4. Reward manipulations match predictions of the exploration model. (a) The inattention, fixed error, and exploration models make different
predictions for increases and decreases in the reward magnitude for rightward (high-rate) actions. The inattention model (left panel) predicts changes in
lapses for both high- and low-rate choices, while fixed error models such as motor error or e-greedy (center) predict changes in neither lapse, and the
uncertainty-dependent exploration model (right) predicts changes in lapses only for high-rate choices. Black line denotes equal rewards on both sides;
green, increased rightward reward; red, decreased rightward reward. (b) Schematic of rate discrimination trials and interleaved ‘sure bet’ trials. The
majority of the trials (94%) were rate discrimination trials as described in Figure 1. On sure-bet trials, a pure tone was played during a 0.2 s fixation
period and one of the side ports was illuminated once the tone ended to indicate that reward was available there. Rate discrimination and sure-bet
trials were randomly interleaved, as were left and right trials, and the rightward reward magnitude was either increased (36 mL) or decreased (16 mL)
while maintaining the leftward reward at 24 mL. (c) Rats’ behavior on rate discrimination trials following reward magnitude manipulations. High-rate
lapses decrease when water reward for high-rate choices is increased (left panel; n = 3 rats, 6976 trials), while high-rate lapses increase when reward on
that side is decreased (right panel; n = 3 rats, 11,164 trials). Solid curves are exploration model fits with a single parameter change accounting for the
manipulation. (d) Rats show nearly perfect performance on sure-bet trials and are unaffected by reward manipulations on these trials. (e) Reward
probability manipulation. (Left) Schematic of probabilistic reward trials, incorrect (leftward) choices on high rates were rewarded with a probability of
0.5, and all other rewards were left unchanged. (Right) Rats’ behavior and exploration model fits showing a selective increase in high-rate lapses (n = 5
rats, 34,292 trials). (f) Rats’ behavior on equal reward trials conditioned on successes (green) or failures (red) on the right on the previous trials resembles
effects of reward size manipulations. (g) Model comparison showing that Akaike Information Criterion and Bayes Information Criterion both favor the
exploration model on data from all three manipulations.
Figure 4 continued on next page
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decreased reward). This suggests that the effects of reward manipulations that we observed
(Figure 4c) are not a default consequence of reward imbalance, but a consequence of a reward-
dependent trade-off between exploitation and uncertainty-guided exploration.
As an additional test of the model, we manipulated expected rewards by probabilistically reward-
ing incorrect choices for one of the stimulus categories. Here, leftward choices on high-rate (‘go
right’) trials were rewarded with a probability of 0.5, while leaving all other rewards unchanged
(Figure 4e left). The exploration model predicts that this should selectively increase the value of left-
ward actions on high-rate trials, hence shifting the trade-off toward exploration on high rates and
increasing high-rate lapses. Indeed, this is what we observed (Figure 4e right, n = 5 animals,
347,537 trials), and the effect was strikingly similar to the decreased reward experiment, even
though the two manipulations affect high-rate action values through changes on opposite actions.
This experiment in particular distinguishes the exploration model from motivation-dependent mod-
els of disengagement or inattention in which overall reward modulates the total lapse rate through a
nonspecific process that averages over stimulus categories (Figure 4—figure supplement 1a–c,f).
Moreover, this suggests that lapses reflect changes in stimulus-specific action value caused by
changing either reward magnitudes or reward probabilities, as one would expect from the explora-
tion model. Across experiments (Figure 4—source data 1) and individuals, these changes were cap-
tured by selectively changing the relevant baseline action value in the model, despite variability in
these baselines.
An added consequence of uncertainty in action values is that it should encourage continued
learning even in the absence of explicit reward manipulations. This means that animals should con-
tinue to use the outcomes of previous trials to update the values of different actions as long as this
uncertainty persists. Such persistent learning has been observed in a number of studies
(Busse et al., 2011; Lak et al., 2018; Mendonca et al., 2018; Odoemene et al., 2018; Pinto et al.,
2018; Scott et al., 2015). The uncertainty-dependent exploration model predicts that the effect of
recent outcome history on action values should manifest as changes in lapse rates, rather than as
horizontal biases caused by irrelevant, non-sensory evidence as is often assumed (Busse et al.,
2011). For example, the action value of rightward choices should increase following a rightward suc-
cess, producing similar changes to lapses as increased rightward reward magnitude. As predicted,
trials following rewarded and unrewarded rightward choices showed decreased and increased
lapses, respectively (Figure 4f; same rats and trials as in Figure 2e). Taken together, manipulations
of value confirm the predictions of the uncertainty-dependent exploration model (Figure 4g).
Lapses are a powerful tool for assigning decision-related computations
to neural structures based on disruption experiments
The results of the behavioral manipulations (above) predict that unilateral disruption of neural
regions that leads to a one-sided scaling of learnt stimulus-action values should affect lapse rates
asymmetrically. In contrast, disruptions to areas that process sensory evidence would lead to hori-
zontal biases without affecting action values or lapses, and disruptions to motor areas that make one
of the actions harder to perform irrespective of the stimulus would affect both lapses (Figure 4—fig-
ure supplement 2a top, middle). Crucially, in the absence of lapses, all three of these disruptions
would drive an identical behavioral effect, a horizontal shift of the psychometric function (Figure 4—
figure supplement 2a bottom). Indeed, the same reward manipulations that gave rise to distinct
value biases in rats with sizeable lapses (Figure 4—figure supplement 2b top) led to horizontal
shifts indistinguishable from sensory biases in highly trained rats with negligible lapses on multisen-
sory trials (Figure 4—figure supplement 2b bottom). This suggests that lapses are actually informa-
tive about decision-making computations and can be used as a tool to determine which
computations are affected by disruptions of a candidate brain region. To demonstrate this, we
Figure 4 continued
The online version of this article includes the following source data and figure supplement(s) for figure 4:
Source data 1. Fit parameters to pooled data across rats.
Figure supplement 1. Alternative models of inattentional lapses.
Figure supplement 2. Psychometric functions with lapses make it possible to assign perturbations effects to specific stages of decision-making.
Pisupati, Chartarifsky-Lynn, et al. eLife 2021;10:e55490. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.55490 11 of 27
Research article Neuroscience
identified two candidate areas, secondary motor cortex (M2) and posterior striatum (pStr), that
receive convergent input from primary visual and auditory cortices (Figure 5—figure supplement 1,
results of simultaneous anterograde tracing from V1 and A1; also see Jiang and Kim, 2018;
Barthas and Kwan, 2017). In previous work, disruptions of these areas had effects on auditory deci-
sions, including changes in lapses (Erlich et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2018). However, considerable con-
troversy remains as to which computations were affected by those disruptions. The effects were
largely interpreted in terms of traditional ideal observer models (see Siniscalchi et al., 2019 for a
notable exception), and thus attributed to perceptual biases (Guo et al., 2018), leaky accumulation
(Erlich et al., 2015) or post-categorization biases (Piet et al., 2017; Erlich et al., 2015). Notably,
the asymmetric effects on lapses seen in these studies resembled the effects of the reward manipula-
tions in our task, hinting that they may actually arise from action value changes. Importantly, these
existing studies used only auditory stimuli, so were limited in their ability to distinguish sensory-spe-
cific deficits from action value deficits.
Here, we used analyses of lapses to determine the decision-related computations altered by uni-
lateral disruption of M2 and pStr. If these disruptions affected action values, the exploration model
makes three strong predictions. First, because action values are computed late in the decision-mak-
ing process, the model predicts that the effects should not depend on the modality of the stimulus.
We therefore performed disruptions in animals doing interleaved auditory, visual, and multisensory
trials. If pStr and M2 indeed compute action value, then following unilateral disruption of these
areas, our model should capture changes to all three modalities by a single parameter change to the
contralateral action value. Second, these disruptions should selectively affect lapses on stimuli asso-
ciated with contralateral actions, irrespective of the stimulus-response contingency. To test this, we
performed disruptions on animals trained on standard and reversed contingencies. Finally, because
altered action values should have no effect when there is no uncertainty and consequently no explo-
ration, disruption to pStr and M2 should spare performance on sure-bet trials (Figure 4b, bottom).
We suppressed activity of neurons in each of these areas using muscimol, a GABAA agonist, dur-
ing our multisensory rate discrimination task. We implanted bilateral cannulae in M2 (Figure 5a, Fig-
ure 5—figure supplement 2b; n = 5 rats; +2 mm AP 1.3 mm ML, 0.3 mm DV) and pStr (Figure 5a,
Figure 5—figure supplement 2a; n = 6 rats;  3.2 mm AP, 5.4 mm ML, 4.1 mm DV). On control
days, rats were infused unilaterally with saline, followed by unilateral muscimol infusion the next day
(M2: 0.1–0.5 mg, pStr 0.075–0.125 mg). We compared performance on the multisensory rate discrimi-
nation task for muscimol days with preceding saline days. Inactivation of the side associated with
low-rate choices biased the animals to make more low-rate choices (Figure 5b; left six panels: empty
circles, inactivation sessions; full circles, control sessions), while inactivation of the side associated
with high rates biased them to make more high-rate choices (Figure 5b, right six panels). The inacti-
vations largely affected lapses on the stimulus rates associated with contralateral actions, while spar-
ing those associated with ipsilateral actions (Figure 5c). These results recapitulated previous findings
and were strikingly similar to the effects we observed following reward manipulations (as seen in
Figure 4c, right panel). These effects were seen across areas (Figure 5b, top, M2; bottom, pStr) and
modalities (Figure 5b; green, auditory; blue, visual and red, multisensory).
Fitting averaged data across rats with the exploration model revealed that, in keeping with the
first model prediction, the effects on lapses in all modalities could be captured by scaling the contra-
lateral action value by a single parameter (Figure 5b, joint fits to control [solid lines] and inactivation
trials [dotted lines] across modalities with the ‘biased value’ model, differing only by a single param-
eter), similar to the reward manipulation experiments. Animals that were inactivated on the side
associated with high rates showed increased lapses on low-rate trials (Figure 5c, bottom right; data
points are above the unity line; n = 9 rats), but unchanged lapses on high-rate trials (Figure 5c, top
right; data points are on the unity line). This was consistent across areas and modalities (Figure 5c;
M2, triangles; pStr, circles; blue, visual; green, auditory; red, multisensory). Similarly, animals that
were inactivated on the side associated with low rates showed the opposite effect: increased lapses
on high-rate trials (Figure 5c, top left; n = 10 rats), while lapses did not change for low-rate trials
(Figure 5c, bottom left). Fits to individual animals revealed that the majority of animals were best fit
by the ‘biased value’ model (6/8 rats in M2 – Figure 5—figure supplement 3, 7/11 in pStr – Fig-
ure 5—figure supplement 4), and the remaining animals were best fit by the ‘biased effort’ model.
In keeping with the second prediction, when we compared the effects of the disruptions in ani-
mals trained on standard and reversed contingencies (low rates rewarded with leftward or rightward
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Figure 5. Inactivation of secondary motor cortex and posterior striatum affects lapses, suggesting a role in action value encoding. (a) Schematic of
cannulae implants in M2 (top) and pStr (bottom) and representative coronal slices. For illustration purposes only, the schematic shows implants in the
right hemisphere; however, the inactivations shown in panel (b) were performed unilaterally on both hemispheres. (b) Unilateral inactivation of M2 (top)
and pStr (bottom). Left six plots: inactivation of the side associated with low rates shows increased lapses for high rates on visual (blue), auditory
(green), and multisensory (red) trials (M2: n = 5 rats; 10,329 control trials, full line; 6174 inactivation trials, dotted line; pStr: n = 5 rats; 10,419 control
trials; 6079 inactivation trials). Right six plots: inactivation of the side associated with high rates shows increased lapses for low rates on visual, auditory,
and multisensory trials (M2: n = 3 rats; 5678 control trials; 3816 inactivation trials; pStr: n = 6 rats; 11,333 control trials; 6838 inactivation trials). Solid lines
are exploration model fits, accounting for inactivation effects across all three modalities by scaling all contralateral values by a single parameter. (c)
Increased high-rate lapses following unilateral inactivation of the side associated with low rates (top left); no change in low-rate lapses (bottom left) and
vice versa for inactivation of the side associated with high rates (top, bottom right). Control data on the abscissa is plotted against inactivation data on
the ordinate. Same animals as in b. Green, auditory trials; blue, visual trials; red, multisensory trials. Abbreviations: posterior striatum (pStr), secondary
motor cortex (M2). (d) Sure bet trials are unaffected following inactivation. Pooled data shows that rats that were inactivated on the side associated with
high rates make near perfect rightward and leftward choices Top, M2 (three rats); bottom, pStr (six rats). (e) Model comparison of three possible
multisensory deficits – reduction of contralateral evidence by a fixed amount (left), reduction of contralateral value by a fixed amount (center), or an
increased contralateral effort by a fixed amount (right). Both Akaike Information Criterion and Bayes Information Criterion suggest a value deficit. (f)
Proposed computational role of M2 and striatum. Lateralized encoding of left and right action values by right and left M2/pStr (bottom) explains the
asymmetric effect of unilateral inactivations on lapses (top).
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 5:
Figure supplement 1. pStr and M2 receive direct projections from visual and auditory cortex.
Figure supplement 2. Histological slices of implanted rats.
Figure supplement 3. Single rat performance following M2 inactivation.
Figure supplement 4. Single rat performance following pStr inactivation.
Figure supplement 5. Unilateral inactivation of M2 or pStr biases performance ipsilaterally and increases contralateral lapses.
Figure 5 continued on next page
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actions respectively), the effects were always restricted to lapses on the stimuli associated with the
side contralateral to the inactivation (Figure 5—figure supplement 5), always resembling a devalua-
tion of contralateral actions (Figure 5—figure supplement 6).
A model comparison across rats revealed that a fixed multiplicative scaling of contralateral value
captured the inactivation effects much better than a fixed reduction in contralateral sensory evidence
or a fixed addition of contralateral motor effort, both for M2 (Figure 5e, top) and pStr (Figure 5e,
bottom). In uncertain conditions, this reduced contralateral value gives rise to more exploratory
choices and hence more lapses on one side (Figure 5f, top).
The final prediction of the exploration model is that changes in action value will only affect trials
in which there was uncertainty about the outcome. In keeping with that prediction, performance was
spared on sure-bet trials (Figure 5d): rats made correct rightward and leftward choices regardless of
the side that was inactivated. This observation provides further reassurance that the changes we
observed on more uncertain conditions did not simply reflect motor impairments that drove a ten-
dency to favor ipsilateral movements. Additional movement parameters such as wait time in the cen-
ter port and movement times to ipsilateral and contralateral reward ports were likewise largely
spared (Figure 5—figure supplement 7), suggesting that effects on decision outcome were not due
to an inactivation-induced motor impairment.
Together, these results demonstrate that lapses are a powerful tool for interpreting behavioral
changes in disruption experiments. For M2 and pStr disruptions, our analysis of lapses and deploy-
ment of the exploration model allowed us to reconcile previous inactivation studies. Our results sug-
gest that M2 and pStr have a lateralized, modality-independent role in computing the expected
value of actions (Figure 5f, bottom).
Discussion
Perceptual decision-makers have long been known to display a small fraction of errors even on easy
trials. Until now, these ‘lapses’ were largely regarded as a nuisance and lacked a comprehensive,
normative explanation. Here, we propose a novel explanation for lapses: that they reflect a strategic
balance between exploiting known rewarding options and exploring uncertain ones. Our model
makes strong predictions for lapses under diverse decision-making contexts, which we have tested
here. First, the model predicts more lapses on conditions with higher perceptual uncertainty, such as
unisensory (Figure 2) or neutral (Figure 3), compared to matched multisensory or sure-bet condi-
tions. Second, the model predicts that stimulus-specific reward manipulations should produce stimu-
lus-specific effects on lapses, sparing decisions about un-manipulated or highly certain stimulus-
action pairs (Figure 4). Finally, the model predicts that lapses should be affected by perturbations to
brain regions that encode action value. Accordingly, we observed that inactivations of secondary
motor cortex and posterior striatum affected lapses similarly across auditory, visual and multisensory
decisions, and could be accounted for by a one-parameter change to the action value (Figure 5).
Taken together, our model and experimental data argue strongly that far from being a nuisance,
lapses are informative about animals’ subjective action values and reflect a trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation.
Considerations of value have provided many useful insights into aspects of behavior that seem
sub-optimal at first glance from the perspective of perceptual ideal observers. For instance, many
perceptual tasks are designed with accuracy in mind – defining an ideal observer as one who maxi-
mizes accuracy, in line with classical signal detection theory. However, in practice, the success or fail-
ure of different actions may be of unequal value to subjects, especially if reward or punishment is
delivered explicitly, as is often the case with nonhuman subjects. This may give rise to biases that
can only be explained by an observer that maximizes expected utility (Dayan and Daw, 2008). Simi-
larly, outcomes on a given trial can influence decisions about stimuli on subsequent trials through
reinforcement learning, giving rise to serial biases. These biases occur even though the ideal
Figure 5 continued
Figure supplement 6. Inactivations devalue contralateral actions irrespective of associated stimulus.
Figure supplement 7. No significant effect on movement parameters following muscimol inactivation.
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observer should treat the evidence on successive trials as independent (Lak et al., 2018;
Mendonca et al., 2018). When subjects can control how long they sample the stimulus, subjects
maximizing reward rate may choose to make premature decisions, sacrificing accuracy for speed
(Bogacz et al., 2006; Drugowitsch et al., 2014). Finally, additional costs of exercising mental effort
could lead to bounded optimality through ‘satisficing’ or finding good enough solutions
(Mastrogiorgio and Petracca, 2018; Fan et al., 2018).
Here, we take further inspiration from considerations of value to provide a novel, normative
explanation for lapses in perceptual decisions. Our results argue that lapses are not simply acciden-
tal errors made as a consequence of attentional ‘blinks’ or motor ‘slips’, but can reflect a deliberate,
internal source of behavioral variability that facilitates learning and information gathering when the
values of different actions are uncertain. This explanation connects a well-known strategy in value-
based decision-making to a previously mysterious phenomenon in perceptual decision-making.
Although exploration no longer yields the maximum utility on any given trial, it is critical for envi-
ronments in which there is uncertainty about expected reward or stimulus-response contingency,
especially if these need to be learnt or refined through experience. By encouraging subjects to sam-
ple multiple options, exploration can potentially improve subjects’ knowledge of the rules of the
task, helping them to increase long-term utility. This offers an explanation for the higher rate of
lapses seen in humans on tasks with abstract (Raposo et al., 2012), non-intuitive (Mihali et al.,
2018), or non-verbalizable (Flesch et al., 2018) rules. Exploration is also critical for dynamic environ-
ments in which rules or rewards drift or change over time. Subjects adapted to such dynamic real-
world environments might entertain the possibility of non-stationarity even in tasks or periods where
rewards are truly stationary, and such mismatched beliefs predict residual levels of exploration even
in well-trained subjects (Figure 3—figure supplement 2g, middle). Such beliefs could be probed by
challenging subjects with unsignalled changes in rewards and measuring how quickly they recover
from these change-points. For instance, primates with higher levels of tonic exploration on cognitive
set-shifting tasks (Ebitz et al., 2019) are more flexible and make fewer perseverative errors at
change-points, at the cost of more lapses in rule adherence during stable periods.
Balancing exploration and exploitation is computationally challenging, and the mechanism we
propose here, Thompson sampling, is an elegant heuristic for achieving this balance. This strategy
has been shown to be utilized by humans in value-based decision-making tasks (Wilson et al., 2014;
Speekenbrink and Konstantinidis, 2015; Gershman, 2018) and is asymptotically optimal even in
partially observable environments involving perceptual uncertainty such as ours (Figure 3—figure
supplement 2c, Leike et al., 2016). It can be naturally implemented through a sampling scheme
where the subject samples action values from a learnt distribution and then maximizes with respect
to the sample. This strategy predicts that conditions with higher perceptual uncertainty and conse-
quently higher value uncertainty should have more exploration, and consequently higher lapse rates,
explaining the pattern of lapse rates we observed on unisensory vs. multisensory trials as well as on
neutral vs. matched trials. A lower rate of lapses on multisensory trials has also been reported on a
visual-tactile task in rats (Nikbakht et al., 2018) and a vestibular integration task in humans
(Bertolini et al., 2015) and can potentially account for the apparent supra-optimal integration that
has been reported in a number of rodent, nonhuman primate and human studies (Nikbakht et al.,
2018; Hou et al., 2018; Raposo et al., 2012). A strong prediction of uncertainty guided exploration
is that the animal should quickly learn to exploit on conditions with little or no uncertainty, as we
observed on sure-bet trials (Figures 4d and 5d).
Uncertainty-guided exploration also predicts that exploratory choices, and consequently lapses,
should decrease with training as the animal becomes more certain of the rules and expected
rewards, explaining training-dependent effects on lapses in our rats (Figure 3—figure supplement
2g, right) and similar effects reported in primates (Law and Gold, 2009; Cloherty et al., 2019). This
can also potentially explain why children have higher lapse rates (Witton et al., 2017;
Manning et al., 2018), as they have been shown to be more exploratory in their decisions than
adults (Lucas et al., 2014).
A unique prediction of the exploration model is that one-sided reward manipulations should have
one-sided effects on lapses, unlike the inattention or motor error models. These predictions are
borne out in our data (Figure 4c); moreover, they offer a principled, theoretically grounded way to
distinguish between different sources of lapses. This approach can be extended to connect richer
statistical descriptions of behavior to psychological variables such as evidence and action value. For
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instance, some authors have proposed that some of the variance attributed to lapses can be
accounted for by allowing psychometric parameters to drift across trials (Roy et al., 2018) or switch
between different settings (Ashwood et al., 2019). Whether this parametric non-stationarity arises
from non-stationary evidence weighting across trials caused by inattention, variable attention
(Shen and Ma, 2019) or attention to irrelevant evidence (Busse et al., 2011), or whether it arises
from non-stationary beliefs about action values that encourage continued learning (Lak et al., 2018)
and bouts of exploration (Ebitz et al., 2019) can be tested using one-sided reward manipulations,
and by extending our model to include trial-by-trial updates of action value based on the history of
evidence and outcomes (Pisupati et al., 2019). By decoupling the values of different actions on the
two stimulus categories, one-sided reward manipulations distinguish between incorrect decisions
made due to a lack of knowledge about the stimulus category (i.e. inattention) and those made
despite this knowledge, due to uncertainty about action values (i.e. exploration). An alternative way
to decouple these two kinds of errors would be to offer subjects additional actions, e.g. by adding
explicit ‘opt-out’ actions (Zatka-Haas et al., 2019), or by adding task-irrelevant actions that subjects
need to learn to avoid (Mihali et al., 2018), affording more opportunities to distinguish exploratory
and inattentive decisions than tasks with two alternative actions.
In addition to diagnosing or remedying lapses, the exploration model can be used to harness
lapses to pinpoint decision-making computations in the brain. Our model suggests that the asym-
metric effects on lapses seen during unilateral inactivations of prefrontal and striatal regions
(Figure 5b) arise from a selective devaluation of learnt contralateral stimulus-action values. This
interpretation reconciles a number of studies that have found asymmetric effects of inactivating
these areas during perceptual decisions (Erlich et al., 2015; Zatka-Haas et al., 2019; Wang et al.,
2018; Guo et al., 2018) with their established roles in encoding action value (Sul et al., 2011) dur-
ing value-based decisions , and strengthens previous proposals that these areas arbitrate between
perceptual and value-based influences on decisions (Lee et al., 2015; Barthas and Kwan, 2017;
Siniscalchi et al., 2019). The effects of inactivation in these studies are consistent with a ‘devalua-
tion’ deficit, or multiplicative scaling of learnt stimulus-action values, resembling the majority of our
inactivations (6/8 rats in M2, 7/11 in pStr) and selectively affecting lapses on stimuli strongly associ-
ated with the devalued actions. However, inactivations sometimes resembled additive deficits in
action value (2/8 rats in M2, 4/11 in pStr), akin to an added ‘effort’ in performing the associated
action irrespective of its learnt value, consistent with some reports in striatum (Tai et al., 2012). Fur-
ther work will be needed to precisely understand the nature of value representations in these
regions and why they are sometimes multiplicatively and sometimes additively impacted by
inactivations.
An open question that remains is how the brain might tune the degree of exploration in propor-
tion to uncertainty. An intriguing candidate for this is dopamine, whose phasic responses have been
shown to reflect state uncertainty (Starkweather et al., 2017; Babayan et al., 2018; Lak et al.,
2018), and whose tonic levels have been shown to modulate exploration in mice on a lever-press
task (Beeler et al., 2010), and context-dependent song variability in songbirds (Leblois et al.,
2010). Dopaminergic genes have been shown to predict individual differences in uncertainty-guided
exploration in humans (Frank et al., 2009), and dopaminergic disorders such as Parkinson’s disease
have been shown to disrupt the uncertainty-dependence of lapses across conditions on a multisen-
sory task (Bertolini et al., 2015), while L-Dopa, a Parkinson’s drug and dopamine precursor, has
been shown to attentuate uncertainty-guided exploration (Chakroun et al., 2019). Patients with
ADHD, another disorder associated with dopaminergic dysfunction, have been shown to display
both increased perceptual variability and increased task-irrelevant motor output, a measure that cor-
relates with lapses (Mihali et al., 2018). Finally, tonic exploration and lapses of rule adherence are
reduced in nonhuman primates that are administered cocaine (Ebitz et al., 2019), which interferes
with dopamine transport. A promising avenue for future studies is to leverage the informativeness of
lapses and the precise control of uncertainty afforded by multisensory tasks, in conjunction with per-
turbations or recordings of dopaminergic circuitry, to further elucidate the connections between per-
ceptual and value-based decision-making systems.
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Long-Evans Rat Taconic Farms SimTac:LE TAC: LONGEV-M, TAC:
LONGEV-F
Recombinant DNA reagent AAV2.CB7.CI.
EGFP.WPRE.RBG
UPenn Vector Core Obtained from the
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Tomato.WPRE.SV40
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Chemical compound, drug Muscimol abcam ab120094
Software, algorithm PALAMEDES toolbox Prins and Kingdom, 2018 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01250
Software, algorithm MATLAB The Mathworks, Inc
Behavior
Animal subjects and housing
All animal procedures and experiments were in accordance with the National Institutes of Health’s
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the Cold Spring Harbor
Laboratory Animal Care and Use Committee. Experiments were conducted with 34 adult male and
female Long Evans rats (250–350 g, Taconic Farms) that were housed with free access to food and
restricted access to water starting from the onset of behavioral training. Rats were housed on a
reversed light–dark cycle; experiments were run during the dark part of the cycle. Rats were pair-
housed during the whole training period.
Animal training and behavioral task
Rats were trained following previously established methods (Raposo et al., 2012; Sheppard et al.,
2013; Raposo et al., 2014; Licata et al., 2017). Briefly, rats were trained to wait in the center port
for 1000 ms while stimuli were presented, and to associate stimuli with left/right reward ports. Stim-
uli for each trial consisted of a series of events: auditory clicks from a centrally positioned speaker,
full-field visual flashes, or both together. Stimulus events were separated by either long (100 ms) or
short (50 ms) intervals. For the easiest trials, all inter-event intervals were identical, generating rates
that were nine events per second (all long intervals) or 16 events per second (all short intervals).
More difficult trials included a mixture of long and short intervals, generating stimulus rates that
were intermediate between the two extremes and therefore more difficult for the animal to judge.
The stimulus began after a variable delay following when the rats snout broke the infrared beam in
the center port. The length of this delay was selected from a truncated exponential distribution
(l = 30 ms, minimum = 10 ms, maximum = 200 ms) to generate an approximately flat hazard func-
tion. The total time of the stimulus was usually 1000 ms. Trials of all modalities and stimulus
strengths were interleaved. For multisensory trials, the same number of auditory and visual events
were presented (except for a subset of neutral trials). Auditory and visual stimulus event times were
generated independently, as our previous work has demonstrated that rats make nearly identical
decisions regardless of whether stimulus events are presented synchronously or independently
(Raposo et al., 2012). For most experiments, rats were rewarded with a drop of water for moving to
the left reward port following low-rate trials and to the right reward port following high-rate trials.
For muscimol inactivation experiments, half of the rats were rewarded according to the reverse con-
tingency. Animals typically completed between 700 and 1200 trials per day. Most experiments had
18 conditions (three modalities, eight stimulus strengths), leading to 29–50 trials per condition per
day.
To probe the effect of uncertainty on lapses, rats received catch trials consisting of multisensory
neutral trials, where only the auditory modality provided evidence for a particular choice, whereas
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the visual modality provided evidence that was so close to the category boundary (12 Hz) that it did
not support one choice or the other (Raposo et al., 2012).
To probe the effect of value on lapses, we manipulated either reward magnitude or reward prob-
ability associated with high rates, while keeping low-rate trials unchanged. To increase or decrease
reward magnitude associated with high rates, the amount of water dispensed on the right port was
increased or decreased to 36 mL or 16 mL respectively, while the reward on the left port was main-
tained at 24 mL. To manipulate reward probability, we occasionally rewarded rats on the (incorrect)
left port on high-rate trials with a probability of 0.5. The right port was still rewarded with a proba-
bility of 1 on high rates, and reward probabilities on low-rate trials were unchanged (one on the left
port, 0 on the right).
Analysis of behavioral data
Psychometric curves
Descriptive four-parameter psychometric functions were fit to choice data using the Palamedes tool-
box (Prins and Kingdom, 2018). Psychometric functions were parameterized as:
 ðx;;s;g;lÞ ¼fðx;;sÞð1 l gÞþg (1)
where g and l are the lower and upper asymptote of the psychometric function, which parame-
trize the lapse rates on low and high rates, respectively. f is a cumulative normal function; x is the
event rate, that is, the number of flashes or beeps presented during the 1 s stimulus period;  para-
metrizes the x-value at the midpoint of the psychometric function and s describes the inverse slope.
95% Confidence intervals on these parameters were generated via bootstrapping based on 1000
simulations.
Our definition of lapses is restricted to strictly asymptotic errors following Wichmann and Hill,
2001, and not simply errors on the easiest stimuli tested. Errors on the easiest stimuli could in gen-
eral arise not just from lapses (strictly defined) but also from perceptual errors caused by low sensi-
tivity to the stimulus, an insufficient stimulus range or non-stationary weights (Busse et al., 2011;
Roy et al., 2018). However, we do not consider easy errors alone to be evidence of lapses and only
consider asymptotic errors. To confirm the necessity of including the lapse parameters, we fit the fol-
lowing variants of the model above, including lapse parameters when warranted by model compari-
son using AIC/BIC:
No lapses
This model forces l ¼ g ¼ 0 for all conditions (visual, auditory, and multisensory) and only allows s
and  parameters to vary across conditions.
Fixed lapses
This model allows for a fixed l and g (which may be unequal) across all conditions.
Restricted lapses
This model allows l and g to vary across conditions, but restricts lþ g to be less than 0.1. This corre-
sponds to an often used prior over total lapse rates, embodying the belief that lapse trials are infre-
quent (Wichmann and Hill, 2001; Prins and Kingdom, 2018).
Variable lapses
This model allows both l and g to vary freely across conditions, allowing them each to take any value
between 0 and 1 (as long as their sum also lies between 0 and 1).
Modeling
Ideal observer model
We can specify an ideal observer model for our task using Bayesian Decision Theory (Dayan and
Daw, 2008). This observer maintains probability distributions over previously experienced stimuli
and choices, computes the posterior probability of each action being correct given its observations,
and picks the action that yields the highest expected reward.
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Let the true category on any given trial be ctrue, the true stimulus rate be strue, and the animal’s
noisy visual and auditory observations of strue be xV and xA, respectively. We assume that the two
sensory channels are corrupted by independent Gaussian noise with standard deviation sA and sV ,
respectively, giving rise to conditionally independent observations.
pðxAjstrueÞ ¼N ðstrue;sAÞ; pðxV jstrueÞ ¼N ðstrue;sV Þ;
pðxA;xV jstrueÞ ¼ pðxAjstrueÞpðxV jstrueÞ
(2)
The ideal observer can use this knowledge to compute the likelihood of seeing the current trial’s
observations as a function of the hypothesized stimulus rate s. This likelihood L is a Gaussian func-
tion of s with a mean given by a weighted sum of the observations xA and xV :

















The likelihood of seeing the observations as a function of the hypothesized category c is given by
marginalizing over all possible hypothesized stimulus rates. Let the experimentally imposed category
boundary be 0, such that stimulus rates are considered high when s>0 and low when s<0. Then,

















where F is the cumulative normal function. Using Bayes’ rule, the ideal observer can then com-





¼)pðc¼HighjxA;xV Þ / pHighð1 Fð0;M ;sMÞÞ
¼)pðc¼ LowjxA;xV Þ / pLowFð0;M ;sMÞ
(5)
where pHigh and pLow are the prior probabilities of high and low rates respectively. The expected
value QðaÞ of choosing right or left actions (also known as the action values) is obtained by marginal-
izing the learnt value of state-action pairs qðc;aÞ over the unobserved state c.
Qða¼ RÞ ¼ pðHighjxA;xV ÞqðHigh;RÞþ pðLowjxA;xV ÞqðLow;RÞ
Qða¼ LÞ ¼ pðHighjxA;xV ÞqðHigh;LÞþ pðLowjxA;xV ÞqðLow;LÞ
(6)
Under the standard contingency, high rates are rewarded on the right and low rates on the left,
so for a trained observer that has fully learnt the contingency,
qðHigh;RÞ! rR;qðHigh;LÞ! 0;qðLow;RÞ! 0;qðLow;LÞ! rL, with rR and rL being reward magnitudes
for rightward and leftward actions. This simplifies the action values to:
QðRÞ ¼ pðHighjxA;xV ÞrR / pHighð1 Fð0;M ;sMÞÞrR
QðLÞ ¼ pðLowjxA;xV ÞrL / pLowFð0;M ;sMÞrL
(7)
The max-reward decision rule involves picking the action â with the highest expected reward:






















In the special case of equal rewards and uniform stimulus and category priors, this reduces to
choosing right when the weighted sum of observations is to the right of the true category boundary,
that is, wAxAþwVxV>0. Note that this is a deterministic decision rule for any given observations xA
and xV ; however, since these are noisy and Gaussian distributed around the true stimulus rate strue,
the likelihood of making a rightward decision is given by the cumulative Gaussian function F:
For pHigh ¼ pLow; rR ¼ rL
pðâ¼ RjsÞ ¼ pðwAxAþwVxV>0jsÞ
¼Fðstrue;0;sÞ
s ¼
sA on auditory trials












We can measure this probability empirically through the psychometric curve. Fitting it with a two-
parameter cumulative Gaussian function yields  and s which can be compared to ideal observer
predictions. The s parameter is then taken to reflect sensory noise; and with the assumption of uni-
form priors and equal rewards, the  parameter is taken to reflect the subjective category boundary.
For the purpose of assessing optimality of integration, s was individually fit to each condition and
compared to ideal observer predictions, but for the purpose of comparing theoretical models of
lapses, s on multisensory conditions was constrained to be optimal for all models. Although  should
equal 0 for the ideal observer, in practice it is treated as a free parameter in all models, and devia-
tions of  from 0 could reflect any of three possible suboptimalities: (1) a subjective category
boundary mismatched to the true one, possibly arising from the use of irrelevant features such as
total event count (Odoemene et al., 2018), (2) mismatched priors, or (3) unequal subjective rewards
rR and rL of the two actions.
Inattention model
The traditional model for lapse rates assumes that on a fixed proportion of trials, the animal fails to
pay attention to the stimulus, guessing randomly between the two actions. We can incorporate this
suboptimality into the ideal observer above as follows: Let the probability of attending be pattend.
Then, on 1  pattend fraction of trials, the animal does not attend to the stimulus (i.e. receives no evi-
dence), effectively making ssensory ! ¥ and giving rise to a posterior that is equal to the prior. On
these trials, the animal may choose to maximize this prior (always picking the option that is more
likely a priori, guessing with 50–50 probability if both options are equally likely), or probability-match
the prior (guessing in proportion to its prior). Let us call this guessing probability pbias. Then, the
probability of a rightward decision is given by marginalizing over the attentional state:
pðâ¼ RjsÞ ¼ pðâ¼ Rjs;attendÞpðattendÞþ pðâ¼ Rjs; ~attendÞpð~attendÞ
¼ pðâ¼ RjsÞpattend þ pbiasð1  pattendÞ
(10)
Comparing this with the standard four-parameter sigmoid used in psychometric fitting, we obtain
pðâ¼ RjstrueÞ ¼ gþð1 g lÞFðstrue;0;sÞ





where g and l are the lower and upper asymptotes respectively, collectively known as ‘lapses’. In
this model, the sum of the two lapses depends on the probability of attending, which could be
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modulated in a bottom-up fashion by the salience of the stimulus; their ratio depends on the guess-
ing probability, which in turn depends on the observer’s priors and subjective rewards rR and rL.
Motor error/ greedy model
Lapses can also occur if the observer does not always pick the reward-maximizing or ‘exploit’ deci-
sion. This might occur due to random errors in motor execution on a small fraction of trials given by
e, or it might reflect a deliberate propensity to occasionally make random ‘exploratory’ choices to
gather information about rules and rewards. This is known as an e-greedy decision rule, where the
observer chooses randomly (or according to pbias) on e fraction of trials. Both these models yield pre-
dictions similar to those of the inattention model:






Uncertainty guided exploration model
A more sophisticated form of exploration is the ‘softmax’ decision rule, which explores options in
proportion to their expected rewards, allowing for a balance between exploration and exploitation
through the tuning of a parameter b known as inverse temperature. In particular, in conditions of
greater uncertainty about rules or rewards, it is advantageous to be more exploratory and have a
lower b. This form of uncertainty-guided exploration is known as Thompson sampling. It can be
implemented by sampling from a belief distribution over expected rewards and maximizing with
respect to the sample, reducing to a softmax rule whose b depends on the total uncertainty in








The proportion of rightward choices conditioned on the true stimulus rate is then obtained by
marginalizing over the latent action values QðaÞ, using the fact that the choice depends on s only
through its effect on QðaÞ, where  is the animal’s posterior belief in a high-rate stimulus, that is,
¼ pðc¼HighjxA;xV Þ.  is often referred to as the belief state in reinforcement learning problems













1þ exp bððrRþ rLÞ  rLÞ




Since lapses are the asymptotic probabilities of the lesser rewarding action at extremely easy








Critically, in this model, the upper and lower lapses are dissociable, depending only on the right-
ward or leftward rewards, respectively. In practice since b can only be specified up to an arbitrary
scaling of reward magnitudes, we either fix rL=1 and fit b and a reward bias
rR
rL
in units of rL (for con-
ditions with different expected b), or fix b¼ 1 and fit rL and rR in units of b (for conditions with the
same b where one of the rewards is expected to change).
Such a softmax decision rule has been used to account for suboptimalities in value-based deci-
sions (Dayan and Daw, 2008); however, it has not been used to account for lapses in perceptual
decisions. Other suboptimal decision rules described in perceptual decisions, such as generalized
probability matching or posterior sampling (Acerbi et al., 2014; Drugowitsch et al., 2016;
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Ortega and Braun, 2013), amount to a softmax on log-posteriors or log-expected values, rather
than on expected values, and do not produce lapses since in these decision rules, when the posterior














! 1) pðRÞ! 1




Inactivations were modeled using the following one-parameter perturbations to the decision-making
process, while keeping all other parameters fixed:
Biased evidence
A fixed amount of evidence was added to all modalities. This corresponds to adding a rate bias of
K  si for a condition with sensory noise si with K>0 fixed across modalities, leading to bigger biases
for conditions with higher sensory noise.
Biased value
The expected values of one of the actions was scaled down by a fixed factor of K<1 across all
modalities. For instance, QLi ! K  QLi produced a rightward biased value for a condition with base-
line leftward expected value QLi. This led to a stimulus-dependent bias in action value and conse-
quently lapses, since QLi is large and heavily affected for low-rate trials, and close to zero and largely
unaffected for high-rate trials.
Biased effort
A fixed ‘effort’ cost (i.e. negative value) K<0 was added to the expected values of one of the actions
for all modalities. This added a stimulus-independent bias in action values, since the difference in
expected values was biased away from the effortful action by the same amount irrespective of the
stimulus rate.
Model fitting
Model fits were obtained from custom maximum likelihood fitting code using MATLAB’s fmincon,
by maximizing the marginal likelihood of rightward choices given the stimulus on each trial as com-
puted from each model. Confidence intervals for fit parameters were generated using the hessian
obtained from fmincon. Fits to multiple conditions were performed jointly, taking into account any
linear or nonlinear (e.g. optimality) constraints on parameters across conditions. Model comparisons
were done using AIC and BIC. For comparisons of fits to data pooled across subjects, AIC/BIC values
were computed with respect to the best fit model, so that the best model had an AIC/BIC of 0. For
comparisons of fits to individual subject data, AIC/BIC values for each subject were computed with
respect to the best fit model for each subject, so that the best model for that subject had an AIC/
BIC of 0, and then summed across subjects.
Surgical procedures
All rats subject to surgery were anesthetized with 1–3% isoflurane. Isoflurane anesthesia was main-
tained by monitoring respiration, heart rate, oxygen, and CO2 levels, as well as foot pinch responses
throughout the surgical procedure. Ophthalmic ointment was applied to keep the eyes moistened
throughout surgery. After scalp shaving, the skin was cleaned with 70% ethanol and 5% betadine
solution. Lidocaine solution was injected below the scalp to provide local analgesia prior to perform-
ing scalp incisions. Meloxicam (5 mg/mL) was administered subcutaneously (2 mg/kg) for analgesia
at the beginning of the surgery, and daily 2–3 days post-surgery. The animals were allowed at least
7 days to recover before behavioral training.
Viral injections
Two rats, 15 weeks of age, were anesthetized and placed in a stereotaxic apparatus (Kopf Instru-
ments). Small craniotomies were made in the center of primary visual cortex (V1; 6.9 mm posterior
to Bregma, 4.2 mm to the right of midline) and primary auditory cortex (A1; 4.7 mm posterior to
Bregma, 7 mm to the right of midline). Small durotomies were performed at each craniotomy and
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virus was pressure injected at depths of 600, 800, and 1000 mm below the pia (150 nL/depth). Virus
injections were performed using Drummond Nanoject III, which enables automated delivery of small
volumes of virus. To minimize virus spread, the Nanoject was programmed to inject slowly: fifteen
10 nL boluses, 30 s apart. Each bolus was delivered at 10 nL/s. Two to three minutes were allowed
following injection at each depth to allow for diffusion of virus. The AAV2.CB7.CI.EGFP.WPRE.RBG
construct was injected in V1, and the AAV2.CAG.tdTomato.WPRE.SV40 construct was injected in
A1. Viruses were obtained from the University of Pennsylvania vector core.
Cannulae implants
Rats were anesthetized and placed in the stereotax as described above. After incision and skull
cleaning, two skull screws were implanted to add more surface area for the dental cement. For stria-
tal implants, two craniotomies were made, one each side of the skull (3.2 mm posterior to Bregma;
5.4 mm to the right and left of midline). Durotomies were performed and a guide cannula (22 gauge,
8.5 mm long; PlasticsOne) was placed in the brain, 4.1 mm below the pia at each craniotomy. For
secondary motor cortex implants, one large craniotomy spanning the right and left M2 was per-
formed (~5 mm  ~2 mm in size centered around 2 mm anterior to Bregma and 3.1 mm to the right
and left of midline). A durotomy was performed and a double guide cannula (22 gauge, 4 mm long;
PlasticsOne) was placed in the brain, 300 mm below the pia. The exposed brain was covered with
sterile Vaseline and cannulae were anchored to the skull with dental acrylic (Relyx). Single or double
dummy cannulae protruding 0.7 mm below the guide cannulae were inserted.
Inactivation with muscimol
Rats were lightly anesthetized with isoflurane. Muscimol was unilaterally infused into pStr or M2 with
a final concentration of 0.075–0.125 mg and 0.1–0.5 mg, respectively. A single/double-internal can-
nula (PlasticsOne), connected to a 2 mL syringe (Hamilton microliter syringe, 7000 series), was
inserted into each previously implanted guide cannula. Internal cannulae protruded 0.5 mm below
the guide. Muscimol was delivered using an infusion pump (Harvard PHD 22/2000) at a rate of 0.1
mL/min. Internal cannulae were kept in the brain for three additional minutes to allow for diffusion of
muscimol. Rats were removed from anesthesia and returned to cages for 15 min before beginning
behavioral sessions. The same procedure was used in control sessions, where muscimol was replaced
with sterile saline.
Histology
At the conclusion of inactivation experiments, animals were deeply anesthetized with Euthasol (pen-
tobarbital and phenytoin). Animals were perfused transcardially with 4% paraformaldehyde. Brains
were extracted and post-fixed in 4% paraformaldehyde for 24–48 hr. After post-fixing, 50–100 mm
coronal sections were cut on a vibratome (Leica) and imaged.
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